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TOPIC 1. MEANING OF DOMICIL.
Section 10. Domicil is the place with which a person
has a settled connection for legal purposes; either because
his home is there or because it is assigned to him by the
law.'
Comment: (1) Jurisdiction often depends upon domi-
cil, and it is therefore necessary in order to determine ques-
tions of jurisdiction to establish the principles upon which
domicil is based. The principal rights determined by a per-
son's domicil concern: (a) status such as legitimacy, adop-
tion and divorce; (b) the transfer by act of law of a per-
*Part of Restatement of Conflict of Laws of American Law Institute.
Reprinted by permission. Annotations added by Pennsylvania Bar
Association. Reprinted by permission.
'In Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893, Sterrett, C. J., defines a
person's domicil as "the place where he has his true, fixed and per-
manent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever
he is absent, he has the intention of returning." In Carey's Appeal,
75 Pa. 201-1874, Gordon, J., defines it as "that place in which a per-
son has fixed his habitation without any present intention of remov-
ing therefrom." These definitions have been frequently quoted with
approval in later cases. In Gearing v. Gearing, 90 Pa. Superior Ct.
192-1926, Bishop's definition is quoted with approval: "It is the
place which the fact and the intent, combined with each other and
with the law, gravitate to center in, as the home."
Other definitions may be found in Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn.
349-1806; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-1872,
and Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906.
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sonal estate as a whole, as for instance, upon death; (c)
the incidence of personal taxes; (d) judicial jurisdiction.
(2) For the purpose of the Conflict of .Laws, it is
chiefly important to fix domicil within a state; but for
other purposes of the law it may be necessary to fix it more
definitely in a local sub-division of the state. Domicil is
usually fixed in a particular house; in which case it would
also be fixed in the city, county, and state which contain
the house. On the other hand, it may not be possible to fix
the domicil morextefinitely than in a city or state.'
1. The laws pertaining to the distribution of per-
sonal property on the death of the owner in state X
and in state Y are respectively equally applicable to
all persons domiciled in the state. A dies leaving per-
sonal property. In determining A's domicil for the
purpose of deciding whether his personal property
shall be distributed under the law of X or under the
law of Y, it is immaterial whether the area of his domi-
cil is regarded as the boundaries of X or Y, or the
boundaries of a political division of X or Y.
2. Under the law of X the tax on A's personal
property which A is obliged to pay and the place of
payment depend on whether A is domiciled in one or
another county of X. It is material that A's domicil
shall be fixed within the boundaries of a county of X.
(3) Domicil cannot be fixed in a broader unit than
a territory having a single system of law, since other-
wise the determination of domicil would not determine the
law which is applicable by reason of domicil.
3. Each unit of federal territory, including the
District of Columbia, has its own law. A is domiciled
in the city of Washington; his dornicil is not in "federal
territory" in general, but in the District of Columbia.
4. The District of Columbia was originally form-
ed of a portion north of the Potomac ceded by Mary-
2See Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893 and Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa.
Superior Ct. 229-1906.
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land and a portion south of the Potomac, including
Alexandria, ceded by Virginia. A different law pre-
vailed in each portion of the District. The portion of
the District south of the Potomac was afterwards
retroceded to Virginia. While this portion was still
a part of the District of Columbia, A was domiciled in
Alexandria; his domicil was not in the District of
Columbia, but in the southern portion of that District.
(4) It is correct to say either that dornicil is a place
or that domicil is in or at a place; but not to say that
domicil is a relation between a person and a place.
Section 11. A question of domicil arising in litigation
is determined by the law of the forum.3
Comment: (1) The principles or rules for ascertaining
a person's domicil, hereinafter set forth, are those which
are generally accepted in states where the Anglo-American
common law prevails. In the legal systems of other civi-
lized states there is a conception of domicil which, although
it may differ in details from the common-law conception,
in its broad outlines is the same. It is impossible for all
legislatures and courts, in dealing with an idea or principle
common to all countries, to express this idea or principle in
identical language; and even if they agreed on identical
language, it would be impossible that they should all attach
the same meaning to such language. Each court in dealing
with any case involving domicil will apply to the determina-
tion of the question its idea as to the law in its own state;
for the law of domicil, like any law which is the expression
of an international conception, is law only because it has
been received as a part of the court's own domestic law;
and it is as part of its own law that the court applies it
to the solution of cases brought before it.
aAccord: Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Frick's Appeal, 114
Pa. 29-1886, and Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906.
Compare: Taney's Appeal, 97 Pa. 74-1881; Taylor Minor's
Estate, 26 W. N. C. 576-1890, and Wilkins' Guardian, 146 Pa. 585--
1892.
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1. A judgment is obtained in X against A, without
personal service, on the ground that A is domiciled in
X. Suit is brought on the judgment in Y. According
to the law of Y, A was not domiciled in X. The court
in Y will refuse to enforce the judgment.
2. A's domicil is alleged to be in France, and evi-
dence is given which tends to establish the fact alleged.
An offer is made to show that according to the French
law another fact, not required by the law of the forum,
is required to establish a domicil in France. This is
immaterial, since the question of domicil in France is
to be determined by the court according to its own law.
(2) In many countries the word domicil is also used
in a different sense to express a different legal conception,
as, for instance, the French doctrine of the elected domicil
at a person's place of business, at which legal service may
be had upon him. In the law of war the expression "com-
mercial domicil" is used to designate the national character
attached to the carrying on of business in a country, and
has nothing but the name in common with the domicil
herein dealt with. Domicil in these different senses should
be carefully distinguished from domicil in its general in-
ternational sense, which is the only form of domicil known
to the Conflict of Laws.
3. A decision that a person had a "commercial
domicil" in X is cited as an authority on the law of
domicil. No weight should be given it, since the ques-
tion there decided is not properly one of domicil.
Section 12. The term "residence" is not always used
in the sense of domicil, and its meaning in a legal phrase
must be determined in each case."
"'Residence is often used to express different meanings, accord-
ing to the subject matter. * * * In ascertaining the meaning of the
word 'residence' in a particular statute the legislative purpose as
well as the context must be kept in view," Mestrezat, J., in Raymond
v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64-1914 on 68-9, and see Hunter v. Bremer,
256 Pa. 257-1917. Raymond v. Leishman contains a general dis-
cussion of the difference between residence and domicil.
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Comment: (1) The term "residence" is sometimes
used as equivalent to "domicil"; sometimes it has a broader
meaning; and sometimes it has a narrower meaning. It
may mean something more than domicil: the domicil,
namely, at which a person is resident. On the other hand,
it may mean something less than domicil: a dwelling-place
adopted for the time being, but not necessarily with such
an intention of making a home there as to create a domicil.
(2) In statutes relating to taxation 5 and voting0 and
in a statute of limitations7 , residence means domicil unless
the contrary is indicated in the statute.
5Accord: Pennsylvania v. Ravenel, 62 U. S. 103, 16 L. Ed. 33
-1858; School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. 568-1841; Short's Es-
tate, 16 Pa. 63-1851; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Orcutt's Ap-
peal, 97 Pa. 179-1881; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890;
Stewart's Case, 265 Pa. 118-1919; Dauphin County v. Banks, 1 Pears.
40-1854; Evan's Estate, 17 Dist. R. 111-1907; Reynard's Appeal, 20
Dist. R. 932-1911; Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J.
451-1918, and Milward's Appeal, 66 Pitts, L. J. 747-1918.
Compare: West Chester School District v. Darlington, 38 Pa.
157-1861.
It is domicil, and not citizenship, which is the basis for imposing
a tax: Frantz's Appeal, 52 Pa. 367-1866.
6Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-1872, seems
to say that residence for voting means domicil; but Simpson, J.,
thinks that it means the domicil at which a person is resident:
"What constitutes a Voting Residence in Pennsylvania," 69 U. of
Pa. L. R. 1-1920; and see Chase v. Miller, 41 Pa. 403-1862; M'Dan-
iels' Case, 2 Clark 82-1844; Taylor v. Reading, 4 Brewst. 439-1870;
Lower Oxford Contested Election, It Phila. 641-1875; Common-
wealth v. Devine, 14 Dist. R. 3, 31 Pa. C. C. 108--1904; Common-
wealth v. Hoke, 2 D. & C. 766--1922; Dawson's Registration, 9 D. &
C. 9-1926, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927.
7Under the criminal statutes "residence" does not refer to the
place, but to the manner of residence, i. e. whether the defendant
has conducted "himself in accordance with his customary mode of
life :" Williams, J., in Commonwealth v. Weber, 67 Pa. Superior
Ct. 497-1918 (affirmed in 259 Pa. 592). See also Graham v. Com-
monwealth, 51 Pa. 255--1865.
In civil cases, residence does not mean domicil. In Hunter v.
Bremer, 256 Pa. 257-1917, Moschzisker, J., says that it means "a
residence of such permanency that the person in question may be
found here and served with ordinary legal process, at any time,
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(3) In statutes relating to gaining a settlement under
the poor law s and to competence of a divorce court,9 resi-
dence means a domicil at which the person in question
resides unless the contrary is indicated in the statute.
(4) In statutes relating to attachment, residence
generally speaking. The existence of such a residence constitutes
one a resident within the meaning of the act, and, on the other hand,
its absence makes him a nonresident."
8In Huston Twp.' v. Benezette Twp., 135 Pa. 393-1890, Clark,
J., says (399): "A settlement under the poor laws is a residence
of such permanent and continuous character as, under certain cir-
cumstances, will entitle a person to support or assistance as a
pauper. When not derived by birth or marriage, or from the rela-
tion of parent and child, when it is gained through the residence of
others, it is acquired generally upon the basis of a settled personal
residence, the permanency of which must be shown in a certain way,
specified by law." Because of the similarity of requirements, decisions
under the poor laws are cited herein as authorities on domicil.
OIn Gearing v. Gearing, 83 Pa. Superior Ct. 423-1924, Keller,
J., says: "Our decisions hold that the residence contemplated by our
statutes relating to divorce is a permanent one with domiciliary
intent; a temporary residence without intention to establish a domicil
is not enough. But, on the other hand, a domiciliary intent not ac-
companied by actual bona fide residence within the Commonwealth
for a year cannot give jurisdiction to our Courts." In accord with
this statement are: Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449-1847; Reed v.
Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Dulin v. Dulin, 33 Pa. Superior
Ct. 4-1907; Heath v. Heath, 44 Pa. Superior Ct. 118-1910; Barn-
ing v. Barning, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 291-1911; Halpine v. Halpine,
52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct.
178 (s. c. 23 Dist. R_ 603)-1915; Harrison v. Harrison, 69 Pa.
Superior Ct. 580-1918; Wilson v. Wilson, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 20--
1922; Starr v. Starr, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 579-1922; Hilyard v.
Hilyard, 87 Pa. Superior Ct. 1-1926; Lyon v. Lyon, 13 Dist. R.
623-1904, and Clee v. Clee, 2 D. & C. 199-1922. On the other
hand, compare Lesh v. Lesh, 13 Dist. R. 537-1903, and Ames v.
Ames, 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 456-1898. As to the wife, it seems that
the husband's residence establishes the wife's residence: Spear v.
Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. 1 D. & C. 699) 1922; at least
until she acquires a new domicil: Hilya'rd v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Superior
Ct. 1-1926. But see Sherwood's Appeal, 17 W. N. C. 388--1886.
Under the acts authorizing procedure by bill in equity for main-
tenance, domicil alone seems sufficient: Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55
Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
means a dwelling place", without regard to domicil, unless
the contrary is indicated in the statute.
(5) For other purposes" the word residence must be
given a meaning by the application of the ordinary rules
for interpretation of written language.
10Accord: Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64-1914; Saunders
Coffee Co. v. Menges, 62 Pitts. L. J. 662-1914; Brown v. Wilson
68 Pitts. L. J. 503-1920, and Atlantic Refining Co. v. Fabian, 2 D.
& C. 16-1922. In Raymond v. Leishman, Mestrezat, J., said (70):
"If the debtor's absence is so protracted that he cannot be reached
by the ordinary process of the court he is (a nonresident) within
the meaning of the statute and the creditor is entitled to the writ."
In the same case, the court quoted with approval the statement by
Chancellor Runyan in Stout v. Leonard, 37 N. J. L. 492, 496, that,
in determining residence, "the creditor and the courts must neces-
sarily be guided by the ordinary and obvious indicia of residence
or the absence of such indications, and the purposes of the act are
not to be thwarted by the secret mental resolves or limitations of
the debtor on the subject of his domicil."
However, the earlier cases seem to identify residence and domicil:
Lyle v. Foreman, 1 Dall. 480-1789; Kennedy v. Baillie, 3 Yeats
55-1800; Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241-1805; Fuller v. Bryan, 20
Pa. 144-1852; Pfoutz v. Comford, 36 Pa. 420-1860; Reed's Ap-
peal, 71 Pa. 378-1872; Reed v. Ketch, 1 Phila. 105--1850; Burch
v. Taylor, 1 Phila. 224-1851; Malone v. Lindley, I Phila. 192-1851;
Hentz v. Asahl, 1 W. N. C. 282-1875; Labe v. Brauss, 2 Dist. R.
157, 12 Pa. C. C. 225-1892; Sheldon v. Forsman, 17 Lanc. L. R.
85--1899, and Wight v. Hovey, 17 Dist. R. 1019, 35 Pa. C. C. 650-
1908; and therefore these earlier cases are cited herein as authorities
on domicil.
. "The meaning of the word "residence" as used in various statutes
is illustrated by the following:
School Code: Residence means actual physical residence: Ben
Avon Boro S. D. v. Pittsburgh Sch. Dist., 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 75-
1921; Confluence School v. Ursina, 88 Pa. Superior Ct. 299-1926,
and Commonwealth ex reL v. Burnside Twp. School District, 8 D.
& C. 498-1926.
Feme Sole Act: Residence seems to mean domicil (see Section
30 infra): Knauer's Petition, 287 Pa. 115--1926.
Guardian and Ward: Residence seems to mean physical resi-
dence, without regard to domicil: Taney's Appeal, 97 Pa. 74-1881;
Wilkins' Guardian, 146 Pa. 585--1892; Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R.
584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465--1893; but see Reitmeyer v. Wolfe, 2 Dist. R.
810, 13 Pa. C. C. 179-1893, and Moore's Estate, 18 Dist. R. 290-
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TOPIC 2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF DOMICIL
Section 13. Every person has at all times one domicil,
and no person has more than one domicil at a time.2
Comment: Since jurisdiction depends in many cases
upon domicil, it is essential that every person should have
a domicil, In order that there should be no conflict as to
the law affecting his rights, the law provides that he should
have a single domicil.
1908. Contra: Ralston's Estate, 3 W. N. C. 392-1877; Taylor
Minors' Estate, 26 W. N. C. 576-2-1890, and Cannon's Estate, 15 Pa.
C. C. 312-1894.
Lunacy Proceedings: Residence means donicil, except for pur-
poses of commitment: Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 37 Pa. 60-1860;
Karmany's Appeal, 242 Pa. 300-1913; Butler County v. Dep. of
Public Charities, 14 Pa. Superior Ct. 70-1900, and Commonwealth v.
Emerson, 1 Pearsbn 204-1861.
Weak-Minded Proceedings: Residence means domicil: Re
Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 38-1926.
Security for Costs: Residence seems to have the same mean-
ing as under foreign attachment (note 10 ante) : Appleton v. Ruth, 15
W. N. C. 127-1884; Kurie v. Dodson Day School, 9 D. & C. 453-
1927. Compare: Hansen v. Ackley, 2 W. N. C. 569-1876, and
McEwen v. Horton, 1 Pa. C. C. 498-1886.
Witness Fees: Residence means physical residence: Biegel v.
Sedler, 74 Pitts. L. J. 64-1925.
Presumption of Death: The last known residence would seem
to mean domicil: Francis v. Francis, 180 Pa. 644-1897; Morrison's
Estate, 183 Pa. 155--1897; Groner v. Knights of Maccabees, 265
Pa. 129-1919; McFarlin's Estate, 267 Pa. 510-1920, and Shultz's
Estate, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 546-1911.
Exemption: Residence seems to be identical with domicil:
Springer v. Lewis, 22 Pa. 191-1853, and Dock v. Cauldwell, 19 Pa.
Superior Ct. 51-1902; although the decision in Yelverton v. Burton,
26 Pa. 351-1855, in conjunction with Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa.
64-1914, might lead to a different conclusion.
12Accord: Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-
1872; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466
-1877; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906;
Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552-1919; Re Guardian for Belle N. Nich-
olls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 38-1926; Hilyard v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Superior
Ct. 1-1926; Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts L. J. 451-
1918, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927; and see the cases col-
lected in the notes to Section 25, infra.
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1. A is a wanderer, without a home; a domicil
is assigned him by law.
2. A has two homes; only one of them is his
domicil.
Section 14. Except as stated in Sections 19, 29, 32, 34,
35, 36, 37, 39 and 41, where a person has one home and only
one home, his domicil is the place where his home i&.3
Comment: (1) The exceptions mentioned relate to
domicil in a vehicle and to compelled domicil.
(2) The fundamental conception underlying domicil
is that of home. The great majority of persons have
homes; in normal cases a person's home is his domicil.
(3) Not all persons have homes; every person must
have a domicil. (See Section 13.) Where a person has no
home the law still assigns to such a person a domicil. The
rule for determining domicil in such a case is set forth in
Section 25. Some persons have more than one home; no
person can have more than one domicil at a time. (See
Section 13.) The rule for determining a person's domicil
where he has two or more homes is set forth in Section 26.
Section 15. A home, as the word is employed in sec-
tions relating domicil, is a dwelling-place of the person
whose home it is, distinguished from other dwelling-places,
not homes, by its physical characteristics and by the re-
13Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, I Binn. 349-1806; Hood's Estate,
21 Pa. 106-1853; Fry's Election Case,.71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila.
575--1872; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's Appeal, 85
Pa. 466-1877; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906; Stewart's Case, 265 Pa. 118-1919; Blessing's Estate, 267
Pa. 380-1920; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist.
R. 603)-1915; Burch v. Taylor, 1 Phila. 224-1851; Cushing v. Tax
Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918; Milward's Appeal, 66
Pitts. L. J. 747-1918; Commonwealth v. Hoke, 2 D. & C. 766-1922;
Dawson's Registration, 9 D. & C. 9-1926, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D.
& C. 666-1927.
In Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178--1915, Trexler, J., said
(182): "The presumption is that where a person lives, there is his
domicil"
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lations between the person and the place.".
Comment: (1) The idea of home is incapable of exact
definition because it is not composed of a definite combina-
tion of definable elements. It is possible to analyze the
idea and indicate at least those elements which should be
considered when the question arises whether a dwelling-
place is a person's home.
(2) In determining whether a dwelling-place is a per-
son's home, consideration should be given to:
(a) Its physical characteristics;
(b) The time he spends therein;
(c) The things he does therein;
(d) The persons and things therein;
(e) His mental attitude toward the place;
(f) His intention when absent to return to the place;
(g) Elements of other dwelling-places of the person
concerned.
(a) Physical characteristics.
No special physical characteristics are necessary. A
person usually has his home within the four walls of a
house, or an apartment, or room. If a person lives in a
"4Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, I Binn. 349-1806; Miller's Estate,
3 Rawle 312-1832; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Fry's Election
Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-1872; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa.
201-1874; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Kirby v. Bradford
County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893;
Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906;
Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Blessing's Estate, 267 Pa. 380-
1920; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Halpine v. Hal-
pine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa.
Superior Ct. 261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c.
23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Harrison v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct.
580-1918; Malone v. Lindley, 1 Phila. 192-1851; Dauphin County v.
Banks, 1 Pears. 40-1854; Harberger's Estate, 13 Phila. 368--1880;
Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465-1893; Evans's Es-
tate, 17 Dist. R. 111-1907; Wight v. Hovey, 17 Dist. R. 1019, 35 Pa.
C. C. 650-1908; Bumpus's Estate, 23 Dist. R. 654-1914; Cushing v.
Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918; Milward's Appeal,
66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918; Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919;
Narr's Estate, 1 D. & C. 786-1922; Commonwealth v. Hoke, 2 D. &
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C. 766-1922, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927.
In Kennedy's Appeal, 81* Pa. 163-1874, home is defined as "a
place of permanent residence."
In Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877, the statement from
Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170, is quoted with ap-
proval: "It depends not upon proving particular facts, but whether
all the facts and circumstances taken together, tending to show that
a man has his home or domicil in one place, overbalance all the like
proofs, tending to establish it in another." Accord are: Guier v.
O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior
Ct. 261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist.
R. 603)-1915; Lyon v. Lyon, 13 Dist. R. 623-1904, and Chesebrough
v. Chesebrough, 7 D. & C. 357-1925.
In the following cases, the facts mentioned have been given great
or little emphasis, depending upon all the other facts:
Voting: Guier v. O'Daniel, I Binn. 349-1806; Miller's Estate,
3 Rawle 312-1832; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's
Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-
1890; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906;
Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552-1919; Reed vj. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior
Ct. 229-1906; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist.
R. 603)-1915; Dauphin County v. Banks, 1 Pears. 40-1854; Com-
monwealth v. Emerson, I Pearson 204-1861; Mintzer's Estate, 2
Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465--1893; Bumpus's Estate, 23 Dist. R.
654-1914; Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919; and Kelly's Ap-
peal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927.
Payment of Taxes: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; Miller's
Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hind-
man's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Scranton Poor District v. Directors,
106 Pa. 446-1884; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890;
Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Malone
v. Lindley, 1 Phila. 192-1851; Bumpus's Estate, 23 Dist. R. 654-1914;
Milward's Appeal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918; Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts.
L. J. 467-1919 (but see Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts.
L. J. 451-1918), and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927.
Assessment or registration: Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877.
Burial Directions: Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Barclay's
Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918, and Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143
(s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897.
Declarations at time of making will, in will, at time of marriage,
etc.: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle
312-1832; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa.
201-1874; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Dalrymple's Estate,
215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa.
401-1918; Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552-1919; Blessing's Estate, 267
Pa. 380-1920; Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R.
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tent, or on a vessel, car or other moving vehicle, such tent,
vessel or vehicle may be his home; but to prove it to be
such, the other elements showing it to be a home, especi-
ally the mental attitude of the person concerned towards
the permanency of the conditions, must be more pronounc-
ed than might be necessary if the usual physical character-
istics of a home existed.
A person's home may be an area in which he has no
one settled dwelling-place1 5 . To prove it to be such, it
must be shown that the person intends to move about
within the area indefinitely or for a very considerable per-
iod of time, and that he has no intention of ultimately set-
tling down in one particular house within the area.
1. A is in legal possession of land X. He erects
a tent on X in which he sleeps, eats and does all the
usual things done in a dwelling house. He has no in-
tention of living anywhere else. These facts consider-
ed by themselves would warrant the conclusion that
A's home is in the tent.
2. A owns a vessel. A sells his house in which
he has had his home and lives with his family on the
vessel until he can purchase a suitable house. The ves-
sel is not A's home.
729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-
1906; Re Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 38-
1926; Malone v. Lindley, I Phila. 192-1851; Harberger's Estate, 13
Phila. 368-1980; Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465--
1893, and Evans's Estate, 17 Dist. R. 111-1907.
Situs of Property: Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Dalrymple's
Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Barclay's Estate,
259 Pa. 401-1918, and Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c.
5 Dist, R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897.
Church Membership: Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918.
Hotel Registration: Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918.
Naturalization: Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853.
In Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906, Orlady, J., says
that "precedents with their necessary varying facts are but of slight
assistance in its solution."
isSee Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893, and Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa.
Superior Ct. 229-1906.
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3. A sells his house in Pennsylvania in which he
has had his home and moves to California. He in-
tends to live always in hotels in that State, but he has
no intention of remaining long in any one hotel or of
living in the same hotels each year. A's home is in
California."'
4. A sells his house in Iowa in which he has his
home, and purchases an automobile. He goes with his
family in the automobile to California. He intends to
move from one point of California to another, travel-
ling in the automobile by day and camping in a tent
by night, until he finds a place in which he would like
to establish a home. A has no home in California until
he finds such place and settles down in it."
(b) The time he spends therein.
It is not possible for a person to acquire a home
without ever being therein (Section 18).'s
No definite amount of time spent in a place is essen-
tial to make that place a home; but the fact that a per-
son lives a considerable time in a dwelling-house has a
strong tendency to show that the house is his home. 9
5. A purchases a house in X, sends his family to
X, directing them to occupy the house. A intends to
follow in a short time. The family occupy the house.
The house is not A's home until A enters it; it is his
home the instant he enters it.20
6. A is an officer in the Navy. His family live in
a house in X. A is away much of the time and often
for more than a year at one time. These absences in
'
6Accord: Hindman's Appeal 85 Pa. 466-1877. Compare Har-
vey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919.
"Compare: Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa. 378-1872, and Kelly's Appeal,
9 D. & C. 666-1927.
1'In 3 Proceedings A. L. I., 246, the elimination of this paragraph
is recommended.
19Accord: Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Harrison v. Har-
rison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918; Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-
1927, and see Halpine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912,
20See Casey's Case, I Ashm, 126--1927,
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themselves do not prevent the house in X from being
A's home.21
(c) The things done therein.
It is usual for a person to eat and sleep in his home.
A person may have his home where he never eats, especi-
ally when all other elements that ordinarily go with a
home exists. It is conceivable that a person can have
a home in a place in which he never sleeps. Doing busi-
ness in a place is not an important element in fixing his
home there.2 2  Though a person does business in a place
and spends more than half his time there, it is presum-
ably not his home if he does not sleep there.
23
(d) The person and things therein.
When a person has his family living with him in a
dwelling-place, it is strong evidence that the dwelling-
place is his home, if, in addition, the person concerned
has his furniture, pictures, books and other personal be-
longings in the place, the evidence that it is his home is
strengthened ;24 it is not conclusive, since he and his
family may be living there temporarily without the in-
tention of having a home there. 25
(e) His mental attitude towards the place.
The mental attitude of the person concerned towards
the dwelling-place in respect to its character and perman-
21Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; see Graham v.
Commonwealth, S Pa. 255--1865; Gearing v. Gearing, 83 Pa. Sup-
erior Ct. 423-1924; and Gearing v. Gearing, 90 Pa. Superior Ct.
192-1926.
Compare: Hansen v. Ackley, 2 W. N. C. 569-1876.
22Accord: Malone v. Lindley, 1 Phila. 192-1851.
23See Blessing's Estate, 267 Pa. 380-1920.
24Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; Hindman's Ap-
peal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890;
Lipps v. Lipps, 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 86-1926; Cushing v. Tax Assess-
ment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C.
666-1927.
2
5Accord: Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874, and Harrison v.
Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918. See Nailor v. French, 4
Yeates 241-1805.
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ency is an important factor in determining whether the
place is or is not his home but is not conclusive.2"
7. A is born and reared in X. A lives with his
family in a house in Y for ten months in the year. For
one month he and his family live in a hotel in X. A de-
tests Y, and always speaks of X as his home, deeply re-
gretting that there is no prospect of his being able to
live anywhere else than Y for the greater part of each
year. These facts are consistent with A's home being
in the house in Y; not consistent with his home being
in the hotel in X.
(f) His intention when absent to return to the place.
The intention to return to a dwelling-place existing
whenever one is absent from that place is an important
element in determining that the place is his home; but a
person may regard a place as his home, though he intends
to be absent even for long intervals. An intention to
make a place one's home is not necessarily an intention
to remain in that place constantly.27
26Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; Miller's Es-
tate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Carey's
Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877;
Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price v. Price, 156
Pa. 617-1893; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Winsor's Estate,
264 Pa. 552-1919; Blessing's Estate, 267 Pa. 380-1920; Lowry's Es-
tate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-
1897; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Halpine v. Hal-
pin, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Su-
perior Ct. 261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c.
23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Re Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa.
Superior Ct. 38-1926; Commonwealth v. Emerson, 1 Pearson 204-
1861; Harberger's Estate, 13 Phila. 368-1880; Mintzer's Estate, 2
Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465-1893; Wight v. Hovey, 17 Dist. R.
1019, 35 Pa. C. C. 650-1908; Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66
Pitts. L. J. 451-1918; Milward's Appeal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918;
Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919, and Kelly's Appeal 9 D. &
C. 666-1927.
27Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; Miller's Es-
tate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106--1853; Carey's
Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Kirby
v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-
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(g) Elements connected with other dwelling-places of
the person concerned.
Whether a dwelling-place is the home of the person
concerned may depend on the elements connected with
other places in which he lives.28
8. A lives entirely in hotels, remaining each year
for nine months in a hotel in X, always occupying the
same room. These facts are compatible with the room
being his home.
9. A (all other facts being the same as in the pre-
ceding illustration) for three months each summer lives
in his own house in Y. These facts are compatible
with the house in Y, rather than the room in the hotel,
being his home.
TOPIC 3. ACQUISITION AND CHANGE OF DOMICIL.
Section 16. The domicil of origin is the domicil assign-
ed to every child at its birth. If the child is the legitimate
child of its father, the domicil of its father is assigned to it;
if the child is not the legitimate child of its father, or is
posthumous, the domicil assigned is that of its mother.
29
Comment: It may be difficult to determine in a part-
icular case what was the domicil of the parent at the birth
1918; and Wight v. Hovey, 17 Dist. R. 1019, 35 Pa. C. C. 650-1908.
See Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18
Pa. C. C. 591)-1897, and Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s.
c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915.
2SAccord: Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Winsor's Estate,
264 Pa. 552-1919; Blessing's Estate, 267 Pa. 380-1920; Lowry's Es-
tate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897;
Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Court 261-1913; Reed v.
Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Harrison
v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918; Bumpus's Estate, 23 Dist.
R. 654-1914; Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-
1918; Milward's Appeal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918; Harvey's Estate, 67
Pitts. L. J. 467-1919, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927.
29Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; School Directors
v. James, 2 W. & S. 568-1841, and Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893.
See also the authorities cited in the notes to sections 32 and 35 infra.
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of the child; but the domicil of the parent having been de-
termined, the domicil of the child is fixed at that of the
parent. There will be particular difficulty if the domicil
of origin of a vagrant, or a gipsy is in question; for it is
usually impossible to determine his parentage and if thaf
can be determined it is probably more than ordinarily diffi-
cult to determine the parents' domicil at the child's birth.
The court woiuld accept as the domicil of origin the place
to which the person in question could earliest be traced;
but this is simply a method of proof in case other proof
fails.8 0
1. A, an army officer, who has never acquired a
domicil for himself, is son of another officer who also
had never acquired a domicil for himself; the grand-
father was always domiciled in Scotland. A is domicil-
ed in Scotland, though he has never been there.31
2. A, a gipsy, arrives in X with his young son B.
Where A comes from is unknown. X will be taken to
be B's domicil of origin.
Section 17. (1) A domicil of choice is a domicil ac-
quired by a person legally capable of changing his domicil
through the exercise of his own will.82
(2) To acquire a domicil of choice, a person must give
up his home, if he has one, and establish a dwelling-place
with the intention of making it his home. 3
3OSee the rule adopted in the poor settlement cases: Crossley v.
Demott, 2 Leg. Op. 161-1871; Overseers of Washington v. Overseers
of Beaver, 3 W. & S. 548-1842; Wayne Twp. v. Jersey Shore, 81*
Pa. 264-1875, and Northumberland etc. Overseers v. Milton etc.
Overseers, 20 W. N. C. 84--1887.
8iSee Gearing v. Gearing, 83 Pa. Superior Ct. 423-1924.
3
21n 3 Proceedings A. L. I., 249 the Reporter adds here the words
"being present there."
"
3 Accord: Lyle v. Foreman, 1 Dall. 480-1789; Miller's Estate,
3 Rawle 312-1832; Fuller v. Bryan, 20 Pa. 144-1852; Hood's Estate,
21 Pa. 106-1853; Pfoutz v. Comford, 36 Pa. 420-1860; Fry's Election
Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-1872; Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa. 378--
1872; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa.
466--1877; Overseers v. Overseers, 6 Sadler 591-1887; Kirby v. Brad-
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(3) The fact of a dwelling-place and the intention to
make it a home must concur; if they do so even for a
moment, the change of domicil takes place.3 '
(4) A person can acquire a domicil of choice only
in one of these three ways:
(a) having no home, he acquires a home in a place
other than his former domicil.3 5
(b) having a home, he gives it up as such and acquires
a new home;"6
ford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893;
Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Bar-
clay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Stewart's Case, 265 Pa. 118-1919;
Blessing's Estate, 267 Pa. 380-1920; Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior
Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897; Reed v. Reed,
30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Dulin v. Dulin, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 4-
1907; Halpine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Hunnings v.
Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Su-
perior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Harrison v. Harrison, 69
Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918; Spear v. Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285
(s. c. 1 D. & C. 699)-1922; Wilson v. Wilson, 80 Pa. Superior Ct.
20-1922; Malone v. Lindley, 1 Phila. 192-1851; Commonwealth v.
Emerson, 1 Pearson 204-1861; Harberger's Estate, 13 Phila. 368-
1880; Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918;
Narr's Estate, 1 D. & C. 786-1922, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C.
666-1927.
34Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; Miller's Estate,
3 Rawle 312-1832; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Pfoutz v. Con-
ford, 36 Pa. 420-1860; Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa. 378-1872; Carey's Ap-
peal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Price v.
Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Ste-
wart's Case, 265 Pa. 119--1919; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct.
229-1906; Barning v. Barning, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 291-1911; Hal-
pine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Hunnings v. Hunnings,
55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct.
178 (s. c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Casey's Case, 1 Ashm. 126-1827, and
Narr's Estate, 1 D. & C. 786-1922.
85See Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 616-1893, and Barclay's Estate, 259
Pa. 401-1918.36Accord: Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241-1805; Guier v. O'Dan-
iel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Pfoutz v.
Comford, 36 Pa. 420-1860; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8
Phila. 575)-1872; Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa. 378--1872; Hindman's Appeal,
85 Pa. 466-1877; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price v.
Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Stewart's Case, 265 Pa. 118-1919; vowry's
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(c) having two homes, he comes to regard one of them
as his principal home. s8
Comment: The requisites for acquiring a domicil of
choice are (1) absence of intention to have a home at the
former domicil; (2) presence in a new dwelling-place; (3)
intention to make this new dwelling-place a home. To ac-
quire a new domicil, these are necessary; but the order of
occurence of these facts is not material; if they all event-
ually coexist, the change is accomplished.
To retain a domicil once acquired, it is not necessary
that all these facts should continue to exist. (See Section
25).
1. A without giving up his home in X acquires a
new dwelling-place in Y, and lives there with an inten-
tion of making it his home, his domicil remains in y.ss
A now decides to give up his former home in X. His
domicil is immediately changed to Y.
2. A, intending to give up his old home in X, ac-
quires a new dwelling-place in Y, in which he lives
without intending to make it his home; he does not
acquire a domicil in Y." A now decides to make his
Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-
1897; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Harrison v. Har-
rison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918; Wilson v. Wilson, 80 Pa. Su-
perior Ct. 20--1922; Casey's Case, 1 Ashm. 126-1827; Malone v.
Lindley, 1 Phila. 192-1851, and Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board,
66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918.
87Accord- Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906; Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552-1919; Blessing's Estate,
267 Pa. 380-1920; Re Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa. Super-
ior Ct. 38-1926; Reynard's Appeal, 20 Dist. R. 932-1911; Bumpus's
Estate, 23 Dist. R. 654-1914; Milward's Appeal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-
1918; Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919; Kelly's Appeal, 9
D. & C. 666-1927; and see Section 26 infra.
3 8Accord: Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Fuller v. Bryan,
20 Pa. 144-1852; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890;
Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct.
143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897, and Harvey's Es-
tate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919.
89Accord: Fuller v. Bryan, 20 Pa. 144-1852; Price v. Price,
156 Pa. 617-1893; Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5
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new dwelling-place his home; at the moment he reach-
es that decision he acquires a domicil in Y.4 0
Section 18. A person cannot acquire a domicil in a
place without being physically present there;"' but a home
in a particular building is not necessary for the acquisition
of a domicil."
Comment: (1) The presence of a member of a per-
son's family at the intended new home is not enough to
change his domicil to the new home if he is not present
there himself.
1. A and his sister B live together and plan a
change of home. A goes to the new dwelling-place but
B, being ill, remains behind in a hospital. B's domicil
does not change.
(2) Even the presence of a person's wife sent by him
to take possession of a new dwelling-place is not enough
to change his domicil if he is not present there himself.
This would be true even if the doctrine of identity of hus-
band and wife still prevailed in the law; since the concep-
tion in this case has ceased.
Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897; Wilson v. Wilson, 80 Pa. Su-
perior Ct. 20--1922, and Narr's Estate, 1 D. & C. 786-1922.
40Accord: Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Reed's Appeal, 71
Pa. 378-1872; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466--1877, and Price v.
Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893.
-1Accord." Lyle v. Foreman, I Dali. 480-1789; Hindman's Ap-
peal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 616-1893; Barning
v. Barning, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 291-1911; Gearing v. Gearing, 83
Pa. Superior Ct. 423-1924; Casey's Case, 1 Aihm. 126-1827, and
Commonwealth v. Devine, 14 Dist. R: 3, 31 Pa. C. C. 108-1904.
However, see the dicta as to the revival of the domicil of origin, cited
in the notes to Section 25 infra.
42See Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Barclay's Estate, 259
Pa. 401-1918; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct.229-1906; Hunn-
ings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913; Milward's Appeal,
66 Pitts. L. J., 747-1918, and Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-
1919.
This section does not apply to cases of compelled domicil: 3 Pro-
ceedings A. L. I. 250.
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2. A, while absent from the country, desires to ac-
quire a new home, and sends his wife to take posses-
sion of the new dwelling-house. A's domicil is not
changed.43
(3) A change of domicil may be accomplished when
the person whose domicil is in question is present in the
new dwelling-place with the intention of making it his
home, though he has not yet eaten or slept there.4"
3. A having no home is domiciled in X. Being
about to marry, A procures and furnishes a dwelling-
house in Y and goes there and makes it ready for oc-
cupation. He never actually eats or sleeps in the house
before going away on his wedding journey. While he
is on his wedding journey his domicil is in Y.
(4) A person may acquire a domicil of choice in a city
by making a home there.
4. A leaves the state in which he has been domicil-
ed and comes to X, a city in another state, intending to
make his home in the city; he lives in temporary lodg-
ings, in hotels and clubs. He is domiciled in X.4 1
Section 19. When a person makes his home in a ve-
hicle (as a boat, a car, or a van), he acquires46 a domicil
in the place, if any, where the vehicle regularly remains
for a considerable time each year, and for a longer time
than it regularly remains in any other place.47
43Accord: Casey's Case, I Ashm. 126-1827.
"4Accord: Reed v. Ketch, 1 Phila. 105--1850.
45See Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa. 378-1872; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa.
Superior Ct. 229-1906; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct.
261-1913; Wilson v. Wilson, 80 Pa. Superior CL 20-1922, and Spear
v. Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. 1 D. & C. 699)-1922. Com-
pare Halpine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Harrison v.
Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918; Re Guardian for Belle N.
Nicholls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 38-1926, and Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts.
L. J. 467-1919.
"In 3 Proceedings A. L. 1. 250, it is suggested that "may ac-
quire" be substituted for "acquires."
47See Guier v. 0' Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806 (sea captain); and
Hansen v. Ackley, 2 W. N. C. 569-1876 (sailor).
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Comment: If the location of the vehicle is not so fix-
ed during a considerable part of the year, the domicil of the
occupant remains his last previous domicil. (See Section
25).
1. A traveling circus remains in quarters in X
every winter, and travels during the remainder of the
year. The domicil of persons whose homes are in the
vans of the circus is in X.
2. T owner of a vessel has his home on the vessel.
The vessel is laid up each winter in X. The owner is
domiciled in X.
3. A laborer on a railroad has his home in a box
car, which is continually carried from place to place
as his services are needed. He does not acquire a
domicil of choice in any of the places to which the car
is taken.
Section 20. A person cannot change his domicil by re-
moval to a new dwelling-place without an intention to
make the new dwelling-place his home.4 8
"
8 Accord: Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Commonwealth
v. Jones, 12 Pa. 365-1849; Fuller v. Bryan, 20 Pa. 144-1852; Pfoutz
v. Comford, 36 Pa. 240-1860; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c.
8 Phila. 575)-1872; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Kirby v. Brad-
ford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893;
Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Bar-
clay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552-1919;
Flaherty's Estate, 285 Pa. 287 (s. c. 6 D. & C. 703)-1925; Lowry's
Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-
1897; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Halpine v. Hal-
pine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa.
Superior Ct. 261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c.
23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Harrison v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct.
580-1918; Spear v. Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. 1 D. & C.
699)-1922; Wilson v. Wilson, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 20-1922; Re
Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 38-1926; Davis
v. Davis, 91 Pa. Superior Ct. 354-1927; Malone v. Lindley, 1 Phila.
192-1851; Commonwealth v. Emerson, 1 Pearson 204-1861; Har-
berger's Estate, 13 Phila. 368-1880; Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584,
13 Pa. C. C. 465-1893; Wight v. Hovey, 17 Dist. R. 1019, 35 Pa. C.
C. 650-1908.
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Comment: (1) The intention to make a new home in-
volves to a certain extent the idea of fixity. A person does
not intend to make a place his home unless he has an inten-
tion to remain there for a time at least. If he intends to re-
main there permanently, it is easier to find that he intends
to make his home there than if he intends to move away at
some time in the future.49 If he does not intend to move
at a definite time, it is easier to find that he has made his
home there than if he intends to move at a definite time5"
It is possible, however, for a person to make his home in
a place even though he does intend to move at a definite
time ;51 although the more distant that time is the easier
it is to find that he has an intention to make his home
there.
1. A, abandoning his former home, fixes his dwell-
ing-place in X with the intention of staying there so
long as he can get a good job, but when work is slack
he intends to move on to another place where he can
get better work; he takes his family to his dwelling-
place and moves his belongings there. A has a home
and a domicil in X.
52
2. A, a student in the academic department of a
University, is in the habit of returning to his father's
home for his vacation and is dependent in part upon
49See Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832, and Halpine v. Halpine,
52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912.
5OAccord: Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241-1805; Miller's Estate,
3 Rawle 312-1832; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1887; Reed v.
Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Cushing
v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918, and Milward's
Appeal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918.
51But see dicta in Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832, and Fry's
Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-1872.
52Accord: Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa. 378-1872; Reed v. Reed, 59
Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; and Lipps v. Lipps,
90 Pa. Superior Ct. 86-1926, Compare Fuller v. Bryan, 20 Pa. 144-
1852; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913, and
Commonwealth v. Hoke, 2 D. & C. 766-1922.
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his father for support. A has no domicil at the Univer-
sity.5s
3. A, after graduation from college, teaches
school for several years and then comes to the Law
School of a University. His expenses are paid partly
from his own money and partly from money borrow-
ed from his father which he is under obligation to re-
pay. If he intends to make it his home he has a domicil
in the University town.
4. A has earned his own living for several years.
He comes to the University to attend the academic de-
partment. If he intends to live there, he has domicil
in the University town.5
4
(2) When a person having a home in a dwelling-place
acquires a new dwelling-place, it is easier to find an inten-
tion to make his home at the new dwelling-place if he gives
up the former dwelling-place than it is if he retains it. 
5
It is possible for a person although he still regards the old
dwelling-place as his home to regard the new dwelling-
place as his home also.56 It is possible, however, for a per-
son to retain his old dwelling-place and to cease to regard
53Accord: Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila, 575)-
1872; and see Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution of 1874,
and Lower Oxford Contested Election, 11 Phila. 641-1875.
5"But see Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-
1872.
55Accord: Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's Appeal,
85 Pa. 466-1877; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890;
Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Har-
rison v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580--1918; Commonwealth
v. Hoke, 2 D. & C. 766-1922. See, however, Price v. Price, 156 Pa.
617-1893; Stewart's Case, 265 Pa. 118--1919; Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa.
Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897; Dulin
v. Dulin, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 4-1907; Commonwealth v. Emerson, I
Pearson 204-1861; Harberger's Estate, 13 Phila. 368-1880, and
Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918.
56On this point, see Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552-1919; Lowry's
Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C.
591)-1897; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist.
R. 603)-1915; Milward's Appeal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918, and Har-
vey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919.
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it as his home. In that case if he regards the new dwell-
ing-place as his home his domicil changes to the new dwell-
ing-place. 51
Section 21. The intention required for the acquisition
of a domiclt of choice is an intention to make a home in
fact, and not an intention to acquire a domicil.
5 8
Comment: A person sometimes desires to have his
domicil in a certain place, in order to get the benefit of one
or more of the legal consequences of having a domicil there,
but does not wish to change his home to that place; this
desire to have a domicil in a certain place has no effect in
fixing his domicil there.
1. A, domiciled in X, desires to vote in Y; he goes
there on the registration day, intending to claim a dom-
icil there, but not intending to make a home there,
and has his name put on the voting list as domiciled
there. He is not legally listed in Y.51
2. A, domiciled in X, desires to have his estate dis-
tributed at his death by the law of Y; he goes to Y,
engages a room for a year, and declares himself do-
57Accord: Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241-1805; Blessing's Es-
tate, 267 Pa. 380-1920; Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts.
L. J. 451-1918; Milward's Appeal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918, and Kelly's
Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927. Compare the facts in Harvey's Estate,
67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919.
58Accord: Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Kirby v. Brad-
ford County, 134 Pa. 109-190; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct.
229-1906; Halpine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Hunn-
ings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa.
Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Harrison v. Harrison,
69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918; Narr's Estate, 1 D. & C. 786-1922;
Commonwealth v. Hoke, 2 D. & C. 766-1922, and Kelly's Appeal,
9 D. & C. 666--1927. See, however, Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552-
1919, and Spear v. Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. I D. & C.
699)-1922.
Similarly, an intention not to acquire a domicil is immaterial:
Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918.
59Accord: Commonwealth v. Hoke, 2 D. & C. 766-1922; Daw-
son's Registration, 9 D. & C. 9-1926, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C.
666-1927.
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miciled there. He however continues as before to live
in X. His domicil remains in X.60
Section 22. The intention to make a home must be an
intention to make a home at the moment, not to make a
home in the future."'
Comment: (1) In order to possess the requisite in-
tention one must be able to say not, this is to be my home,
but, this is now my home.
1. A comes to Y from X intending to go into busi-
ness and make his home there; he buys and occupies a
house and business premises and returns to X to bring
his family to Y. He is domiciled in Y.62
2. B comes from X to Y and buys a dwelling-house
into which he intends to move and make his home at
the expiration of the lease of his present home; and
he employs workmen to fit the new dwelling-house for
occupancy. B's domicil is still X.11
6oCompare Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877, and the con-
verse case of Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-
1918.
elAccord: Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Pfoutz v. Comford,
36 Pa. 420-1860; Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa. 378-1872; Carey's Appeal,
75 Pa. 201-1874; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Kirby v.
Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893;
Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Bar-
clay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct.
229-1906; Barning v. Barning, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 291-1911; Wil-
son v. Wilson, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 20-1922, and Lipps v. Lipps, 90
Pa. Superior Ct. 86-1926.
In Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893, on 626, it is said: "The
requisite animus is the present intention of permanent or indefinite
residence in a given place or country, or negatively expressed, the
absence of any present intention of not residing there permariently
or indefinitely."
The intention to not acquire a domicil is immaterial, if the in-
tention is to establish a home: Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board,
66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918.
62Accord: Reed v. Ketch, 1 Phila. 105-1850.
OAccord: Overseers of Lake District v. Overseers of South
Canaan, 87 Pa. 19--1878, and Wilson v. Wilson, 80 Pa. Superior Ct.
20-1922. Compare Reed v. Ketch, 1 Phila. 105-1850.
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(2) The intention to make a home must be an absolute
one, not conditional on the happening of a future event.
3. A goes to X intending to stay there only if he
passes a certain examination, or if he can get work. A
is not domiciled in X until the condition is fulfilled.
64
Section 23. A person cannot acquire a domicil of choice
by an act done under legal or physical compulsion .
5
Comment: (1) A person does not acquire a domicil
of choice in a place which he cannot legally leave when he
chooses to do so.
The fact that he does not desire to leave is immaterial
as is also his legal right and intention to remain after the
period of legal detention expires.
1. A's domicil is X. A is released from jail on bond
and required to live within a prescribed area, Y. A
rents a house in Y, sends for his family, lives in Y for
years and announces that he has no intention of leav-
nig Y when the period of required residence expires.
A during the period of required residence is still domi-
ciled in X.
2. A's domicil is X. As an officer in the army, A
is required to live in Y at an army post, his family be-
ing permitted to reside and residing with him. A is
still domiciled in X.66
64See Barning v. Barning, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 291-1911.
65Accord: Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. 365-1849; Covode v.
Foster, 4 Brewst. 414-1870, and Election Law, 9 Phila. 497-1872.
If paupers are discharged as such, but are re-employed as ser-
vants, they can acquire a domicil in the poorhouse: Re Registry
Lists, 10 Phila. 213-1874, but compare Murray's Petition, 5 W. N. C.
9-1877.
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution of Pennsylvania
provides that "no person shall be deemed to have gained a residence
by reason of his presence, or lost it by means of his absence, while"
a soldier, sailor, civilian government employee, student, inmate of
a poor house or prison, etc. This does not mean that such persons
cannot acquire a new domicil: Lower Oxford Contested Election,
11 Phila. 641-1875.
"6Accord: Gearing v. Gearing, 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 192-1926,
and Taylor v, Reading, 4 Brewst. 439-1870, But under the divorce
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(2) The compulsion of poverty, or the compulsion
arising from disgust with existing political and social con-
ditions, is not legal or physical compulsion within the mean-
ing of this Section.
3. A's domicil is X. A being destitute and unable
to work becomes, though not legally compelled, an in-
mate of a charitable institution situated at Y. He has
no expectation that he will leave the institution. A
may acquire a domicil of choice at Y.
4. A's domicil is X. A gives up his home in X be-
cause of disgust at existing political or social condi-
tions and acquires a home in Y without any intention
of returning unless these conditions change. He hopes
and expects such change. A acquires a domicil of
choice in y.17
(3) Evidence ordinarily sufficient to establish a domi-
cil of choice may be insufficient in the case of a person, (a)
exiled from his domicil, or (b) resident in a place when per-
forming the duties of a public office, though such persons
may acquire a domicil of choice in the places where they
reside if there is sufficient additional evidence. 68
5. A's domicil is X. A is exiled from X and re-
sides with his family in Y intending to return to X
when permitted to do so. A is still domiciled in X.
6. A (all other facts in the preceding illustration
remaining the same) intends to continue to reside in Y
irrespective of any action on the part of the authori-
ties in X. A acquires a domicil of choice in Y.
statutes, domicil must be accompanied by actual residence: Gearing
v. Gearing, 83 Pa. Superior Ct. 423-1924. For effect of military
service on the statute of limitations, see Graham v. Commonwealth,
51 Pa. 255-1865.
67See Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877.
68 See Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Commonwealth v. Jones,
12 Pa. 365-1849; Dauphin County v. Banks, I Pears. 40-1854, and
Commonwealth v. H-oke, 2 D. & C. 766-1922.
But such persons, although there is no change of domicil, may
be nonresidents within the meaning of the foreign attachment act:
Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64-1914.
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7. A is elected Senator from State X. A pur-
chases a house in Washington and lives there with his
family. A is still domiciled in X.69
8. A's domicil is X. A accepts an executive ap-
pointment in Washington of a character usually held
for life. le sells his house in X, purchases a house in
Washington and lives there with his family. He has
no intention of resigning his position or returning to
X and does not vote there. A acquires a domicil of
choice in Washington."0
9. A's domicil is X. A is an army officer stationed
at Y. He is permitted to live outside the army post.
A marries a resident of Y, purchases a house in Y and
lives there with his family with the intention of making
it his home. A acquires a domicil of choice in Y.70
Section 24. The motive with which a person acquires
a new dwelling-place does not determine the question of the
establishment of a domicil of choice, but it may be import-
ant evidence tending to show whether or not, when a new
dwelling-place is acquired, there is an intention to make a
home there.71
6 9Compare Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. 365--1849, and see
Raymond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64-1914.
7 But compare Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution
of 1874, and Lower Oxford Contested Election, 11 Phila. 641-1875;
see also Lesh v. Lesh, 13 Dist. R. 537-1903.
71Accord: Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241-905; Miller's Estate,
3 Rawle 312-1832; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106---1853; Fry's Election
Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c.,8 Phila. 575)-1872; Hindman's Appeal, 85
Pa. 466-1877; Kirby v, Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price
v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c.
31 Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918;
Flaherty's Estate, 285 Pa. 287 (s. c. 6 D. & C. 703)-1925; Lowry's
Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-
1897; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Dulin v. Dulin,
33 Pa. Superior Ct. 4-1907; Halpine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior
Ct. 80-1912; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913;
Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. (s. c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Har-
rison v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918; Shaw v. Shaw, 72
Pa. Superior Ct. 191-1919; Re Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86
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Comment: (1) If the new dwelling-place is acquired
with the necessary intention of making it a home, it be-
comes a domicil of choice even though there may be a
special, even an unworthy motive, in making the change.
1. A changes his dwelling-place for the purpose of
diminishing his taxes or avoiding the payment of a debt
or for the purpose of securing a divorce. He intends,
however, to make the new place his home. A's domicil
is changed.
7
1
2. A leaves his home and establishes a dwelling-
place elsewhere for the purpose of business, education,
or health, at which he lives for a long time; there is
no evidence of an intention to give up his former home.
A's domicil is unchanged.73
Pa. Superior Ct. 38-1926; Burch v. Taylor, I Phila. 224-1851;
Malone v. Lindley, 1 Phila. 192-1851; Dauphin County v. Banks, 1
Pears. 40-1854; Commonwealth v. Emerson, 1 Pearson 204-1861;
Harberger's Estate, 13 Phila. 368-1880; Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R.
584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465-1893; Wight v. Hovey, 17 Dist. R. 1019, 35 Pa.
C. C. 650-1908; Reynard's Appeal, 20 Dist. R. 932-1911; Saunders
Coffee Co. v. Menges, 62 Pitts, L. J. 662-1914; Milward's Appeal,
66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918; Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919;
Narr's Estate, I D. & C. 786-1922; Commonwealth v. Hoke, 2 D. &
C. 766-1922, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927.
72Accord: Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Reed v. Reed,
30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Harrison v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior
Ct. 580-1918; Spear v. Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. 1 D. & C.
699)-1922, and Casey's Case, 1 Ashm. 126-1827.
Compare: Fuller v. Bryan, 20 Pa. 144-1852; Dulin v. Dulin, 33
Pa. Superior Ct. 4-1907; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct.
261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23 Dist. R.
603)-1915; Abbott v. Abbott, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 483-1921; Hilyard
v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Superior Ct. 1-1926, and Casey's Case, 1 Ashm.
126-1827, most of these cases dealing with the somewhat stricter rule
prevailing in divorce cases (see note 81).
73Accord: Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Fry's Election
Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-1'872; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-
1874; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price v. Price,
156 Pa. 617-1893; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Lowry's Estate, 6
Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897;
Halpine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80--1912; Malone v. Lindley,
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(2) The domicil in the following cases must be deter-
mined by considering whether the change of residence has
been accompanied by an intention to change the home.
(a) Presence for business.
3. A leaves his home in Turkey and comes to Mass-
achusetts, earns money and transmits the money to his
wife, who has remained at the Turkish home, to which
he intends to return after earning a sufficient compet-
ence. A gets no domicil in Massachusetts.
7
'
4. A leaves his home in Massachusetts, and goes
with his family to Shanghai, where he acquires and
publishes a newspaper; he stays in Shanghai for many
years, taking part in the life and affairs of the city and
evincing no interest in his old home. A is domiciled
in Shanghai.7 5
(b) Presence for health or travel.
5. A, domiciled in New York, being advised to go
abroad for his health, goes to Nice, takes a house on a
long lease, and lives there for several years until his
death; being unable on account of his health to return,
although desirous of so doing. A remains domiciled in
New York .7
6. A goes abroad with his family, is delighted with
the life in Dresden, takes a house there on a long lease,
1 Phila. 192-1851; Commonwealth v. Emerson, 1 Pearson 204--1861;
Harberger's Estate, 13 Phila. 368-1880; Wight v. Hovey, 17 Dist. R.
1019, 35 Pa. C. C. 650-1908; Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-
1919, and Narr's Estate, I D. & C. 786-1922.
But see Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241-1805.
74See Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241-1805, and compare Cushing
v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918.
75Accord: Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Hood's Estate, 21
Pa. 106-1853; Reynard's Appeal, 20 Dist. R. 932-1911; Cushing v.
Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918, and Milward's Ap-
peal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918.
76Accord: Harberger's Estate, 13 Phila. 368-1880; compare
Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Evans's Estate, 17 Dist. R. 111-
1907, and Narr's Estate, 1 D, & C. 786--1922.
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and stays there until his death. A is domiciled in Dres-
den."
(c) Presence for the education of children.
7. A, a farmer, moves into a city in the autumn in
order to place his children in good schools during the
winter. A's domicil is unchanged.
8. A, a farmer's widow, sells the farm, and after
examination of several places buys and occupies a
dwelling-house in X, because she believes the schools in
X will give her children the best education. A's domicil
is X.
(d) Presence to attend an educational institution.
9. A, a young man aged twenty-one, leaves his
father's home to enter the senior class in the X Uni-
versity, being undecided where to go upon graduation.
A's domicil is unchanged.7 8
10. A, a young man just graduated from college,
marries and goes with his wife to X, where he enters
a professional school. He takes a house there, intend-
ing to live there until he takes his professional degree.
A's domicil is X.
(e) Presence to escape legal process, or to gain access
to a court.
11. A, a married woman, goes to X for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce there, intending to go elsewhere
upon obtaining the divorce. A-does not acquire a
domicil in X.
9
12. A, college teacher, desiring to obtain a divorce,
"But compare Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918, and Lowry's
Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-
1897.
7
"Accord: Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-
1872.
79See Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Dulin v.
Dulin, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 4-1907; Halpine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Sup-
erior Ct. 80-1912; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261-
1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178-1915; Harrison v. Har-
rison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918, and Spear v, Spear, 80 Pa. Su-
perior Ct. 285 (s. c. I D. & C. 699)-1922,
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solicits and obtains a teaching position in a college at
X, choosing that college because the divorce laws at
X are favorable to his needs. He intends to remain at
the college unless he is later offered a better position
elsewhere. A acquires a domicil in X.
(i) Presence to work in various places.
13. A, an unmarried man with a domicil at X, goes
about from place to place harvesting and logging, ex-
pecting to stay in no one place more than six months.
A's domicil remains at X.
14. A, a married man with a domicil at X, goes to.Y
where he obtains work in his trade, takes a house on
a short lease, and brings his family and his furniture,
He expects to be employed there about six months.
A's domicil is changed to Y.80
Section 25. A domicil once established continues until
it is superseded by another domicil.1Y
Comment: If a man has no home, his domicil cannot
be at his home. Every person must have a domicil (See
Section 13). Therefore when a home is abandoned the
domicil continues until a new home is acquired.
"
0Accord: Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-
1918, and Commonwealth v. Hoke, 2 D. & C. 766-1922.
8 1Accord: Lyle v. Foreman, 1 Dall. 480-1789; Guier v. O'Daniel,
1 Binn. 349-1806; Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Buffaloe v.
Whitedeer, 15 Pa. 782-1850; Fuller v. Bryan, 20 Pa. 144-1852;
Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 106-1853; Pfoutz v. Comford, 36 Pa. 420-
1860; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phia. 575) 1872;
Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa. 378-1872; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201-1874; Hind-
man's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877; Overseers of Lake District v. Over-
seers of South Canaan, 87 Pa. 19-1878; Overseers v. Overseers, 6
Sadler 591-1887; Kirby v. Bradford County, 134 Pa. 109-1890; Price
v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31
Pa. C. C. 177)-1906; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Stewart's
Case, 265 Pa. 118-1919; Flaherty's Estate, 285 Pa. 287 (s. c. 6 D. &
C. 703)-1925; Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist.
R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897; Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct.
229-1906; Dulin v. Dulin, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 4-1907; Halpine v.
Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912; Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55
Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913; Reed v. Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178
(s. c. 23 Dist. R. 603)-1915; Harrison v, Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior
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1. A having a domicil in X ceases to live there.
A gets no other dwelling-place. A's domicil is X.82
Ct. 580-1918; Shaw v. Shaw, 72 Pa. Superior Ct. 191-1919; Spear v.
Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. 1 D. & C. 699)-1922; Wilson v.
Wilson, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 20-1922; Gibson Poor Dist. v. Benton
Poor Dist., 85 Pa. Superior Ct. 377-1925; Lipps v. Lipps, 90 Pa. Su-
perior Ct. 86-1926; Re Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa. Su-
perior Ct. 38-1926; Davis v. Davis, 91 Pa. Superior Ct. 354-1927;
Burch v. Taylor, 1 Phila. 224-1851; Malone v. Lindley, 1 Phila. 192
-1851; Commonwealth v. Emerson, 1 Pearson 204-1861; Harberg-
er's Estate, 13 Phila. 368--1880; Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13
Pa. C. C. 465-1893; Labe v. Brauss, 2 Dist. R. 157, 12 Pa. C. C. 255-
1892; Wight v. Hovey, 17 Dist. R. 1019, 35 Pa. C. C. 650-1908; Har-
vey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919, and Narr's Estate, 1 D. & C.
786-1922.
For the burden of proof of showing a change in domicil, see
Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Flaherty's Estate, 285 Pa. 287 (s.
c. 6 D. & C. 703)-1925; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Lowry's
Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-
1897, and Halpine v. Halpine, 52 Pa. Superior Ct. 80-1912. In
divorce cases, affirmative proof of the abandonment of the former
domicil seems to be required: Dulin v. Dulin, 33 Pa. Superior Ct.
4-1907; Harrison v. Harrison, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 580-1918; Abbott
v. Abbott, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 483-1921, and Goga v. Goga, 5 D. &
C. 669-1924. But see Davis v. Davis, 91 Pa. Superior Ct. 354-1927.
The dicta in some of the cases support the theory that the domicil
of origin revives immediately upon the abandonment of the domicil of
choice: Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Reed's Appeal, 71 Pa.
378-1872; Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R.
729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897; Bremme's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 455, 13
Pa. C. C. 177-1893; Whitehill v. Eicherly, 15 Pa. C. C. 593-1894, and
Sheldon v. Forsman, 17 Lane. L. R. 85-1899, but there is no case
which directly decides this proposition. On the other hand, if that
theory is the law, the following cases seem to be wrongly decided:
Buffaloe v. Whitedeer, 15 Pa. 182-1850; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa.
466-1877; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617-1893; Barclay's Estate, 259
Pa. 401-1918, and Reed v, Reed, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 178 (s. c. 23
Dist. R. 603)-1915.
The cases also seem to require a somewhat higher degree of
proof when the contest is between a domicil of origin and a domicil
of choice: Lowry's Estate, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R.
729, 18 Pa. C .C. 591)-1897, and Narr's Estate, 1 D. & C. 786-1922;
but see Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241-1805.82Accord: Fuller v. Bryan, 20 Pa. 144-1852; Pfoutz v. Com.
ford, 36 Pa. 420--1860, and Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918,
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2. A having a domicil in X goes to live in Y. A
has not yet decided to make Y his home. A's domicil
is X.88
3. A having a domicil in X decides to make his
home in Y. A has not yet gone to Y. A's domicil is
X.
8 4
4. A having a domicil in X decides to make his
home in Y. He leaves X and is on his way to Y but
has not yet reached Y. His domicil is X.
5
Section 26. When a person who has capacity to ac-
quire a domicil of choice has more than one home, his do-
micil is in the earlier home, unless he regards the second
home as his principal home."8
Comment: If a man has two dwelling-places, any one
of the following situations may arise:
(a) One may be a home in the sense used in this Res-
tatement, and the other merely a residence.
8 7
S3Accord: Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 312-1832; Price v. Price,
156 Pa. 617-1893; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918; Lowry's Estate, 6
Pa. Superior Ct. 143 (s. c. 5 Dist. R. 729, 18 Pa. C. C. 591)-1897, and
Narr's Estate, 1 D. & C. 786-1922.
84Accord: Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466-1877, and Casey's Case,
1 Ashm. 126-1827.
85Accord: Lyle v. Foreman, 1 Dall. 480-1789, and Wilkin's
Guardian, 146 Pa. 585-1892.
86Except for the qualification mentioned in note 88, infra, the
cases are in accord with this section: Kirby v. Bradford County,
134 Pa. 109-1890; Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906; Winsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552-1919; Blessing's Estate,
267 Pa. 380-1920; Re Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa. Superior
Ct. 38-1926; Commonwealth v. Emerson, 1 Pearson 204--1861; Mint-
zer's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465--1893; Reynard's Appeal,
20 Dist. R. 932-1911; Bumpus's Estate, 23 Dist. R. 654-1914; Cushing
v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918; Milward's Appeal,
66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918; Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts. L. J. 467-1919,
and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927.
8TAccord: Dalrymple's Estate, 215 Pa. 367 (s. c. 31 Pa. C. C.
177)-1906; Blessing's Estate, 267 Pa. 380-1920; Commonwealth v.
Emerson, 1 Pearson 204-1861; Bumpus's Estate, 23 Dist. R. 654-
1914; Cushing v. Tax Assessment Board, 66 Pitts. L. J. 451-1918;
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(b) Both may be homes in the sense used in this Res-
tatement, but one may come to be his principal home as
his civic and domestic interests attach themselves more
and more to it rather than to the other. In this case the
principal home is his domicil.
1. A, a city merchant, retaining his city home, ac-
quires also a country home. As his children become
older he desires them to be brought up in the country,
and comes to regard the country home as his principal
one. His domicil is his country home.
(c) Both may be homes in the sense used in this Re-
statement, and both in equal degree. In this unusual case,
that one of the two homes which earlier became his dom-
icil remains so.
The earlier home having become the domicil and that
home never having been abandoned, it does not cease to be
the domicil"8
Milward's Appeal, 66 Pitts. L. J. 747-1918; Harvey's Estate, 67 Pitts.
L. J. 467-1919, and Kelly's Appeal, 9 D. & C. 666-1927.
8 8For the conflicting views on this question, reference is made
to 3 Proceedings A. L. I., pages 266 to 274. The Pennsylvania cases
seem to incline to the view that where a person has two dwelling
places, both homes in equal degree, he may elect which one is to be
his domicil. Thus in Winsor's Estate 264 Pa. 552-1919, the Court
says, "It was for him to declare which of his two homes he regarded,
and was to be regarded, as his family or principal residence." Mr.
Justice Simpson says (Voting Residence in Pennsylvania, 69 U. of
Pa. L. R. 17): "So also, if, as in Winsor's Estate, he has two real
homes, occupied at different seasons of the year, one of which has
been treated by him as his domicil and voting residence, he may
change to the other eo instanti by a statement to that effect, if his
future acts accord with the declaration. On the other hand, as in
Blessing's Estate (267 Pa. 380-1920), if one moves with his family
from a residence, no matter how long established, to another, which
latter he and they occupy as a home, though the old house has never
been entirely closed, but has been used by him, during the day
time, for resting and eating, and he has frequently spoken and writ-
ten of his as his home, these facts alone will not suffice to enable
him to select it as his domicil or voting residence, for it is not his
real home." In accordance with Winsor's Estate is Re Nicholl's
Guardian, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 38-1926.
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2. A comes from the country to the city and en-
gages in business, retaining his country home and es-
tablishing a new home in the city. The former home
is his dornicil. He does not regard either as his prin-
cipal home.
3. A, a city merchant, retaining his city home,
acquires also a country home. He does not regard
either as his principal home. The former is his domicil.
Section 27. Where a person has his home in a dwell-
ing-house which is situated upon a dividing line between
political divisions of territory, his domicil is within that
territorial division in which a preponderant part of his
dwelling-house is situated; if there is no decided prepond-
erance, the domicil is in the territorial division in which the
principal entrance to the house is situated."'
Comment: The situation is a technical one, caused by
the purely arbitrary political division; and any rule adopted
to solve the problem must be an artificial one.
1. A's dwelling-house is cut by the line between
X and Y. Only three feet along the western end of
the house is in X, the remainder in Y. A is domiciled
in Y.
2. The line between X and Y nearly bisects A's
dwelling-house. The principal entrance of the house
is in Y. A is domiciled in Y.
Compare Reynard's Appeal, 20 Dist. R. 932-1911, and Bumpus's
E1state, 23 Dist. R. 654-1914; and see the note 89.
89The authorities seem to say that in such a case, the person
may elect in which division his domicil is to be: Follweiler v. Lutz,
112 Pa. 107-1886. The act of May 24, 1878, P. L. 131, 4 Purdon
4630, Section 205; Pa. St. 1920, Section 20599, gives the owner the
right to choose his place of residence; but a choice, once made, is
binding on himself and on future owners. See also Lancaster v.
Bare, 8 Dist. R. 472-1899, and compare Re Registration, 67 Pitts. L.
J. 792-1919.
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TOPIC 4. COMPELLED DOMICIL
Section 28. A person who has not capacity to acquire
a dornicil of choice has a domicil assigned to him regardless
of his will. This domicil is a compelled domiciL90
Comment: A person's domicit may be the place at
which he has his home, or it may be a place assigned to
him by law as his domicil, even though it is not his home.
(Pee Section 10.) A person who is legally capable of ac-
quiring a domicil of choice may acquire a domicil in a
place by making his home in that place. (See Section 17.)
Certain persons are incapable of acquiring a domicil in this
manner; but since such persons must have a domicil, a
place is assigned to them by law as their domicil whether
or not they have a home in that place. The principles
governing the fixing of the domicil of these persons are
given in Sections 29 to 41.
Section 29.__ Except as stated in Section 30, a wife has
the same donicil as that of her husband.9 '
BOThis is a definitive section, and hence there are no authorities
directly on this point.
91Accord: Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S. & R. 84-1826; Dorsey
v. Dorsey, 7 Watts 349-1838; School Directors v. James, 2 W. &
S. 568-1.841; Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449-1847; Buffaloe v.
Whitedeer, 15 Pa. 182-1850; Overseers of Lake District v. Over-
seers of South Canaan, 87 Pa. 19-1878; Scranton Poor District v.
Directors, 106 Pa. 446-1884; Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918;
Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Wilson v. Wilson, 80
Pa. Superior Ct. 20-1922; Starr v. Starr, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 579-
1922; Spear v. Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. 1 D. & C. 699)-
1922; Gibson Poor Dist. v. Benton Poor Dist., 85 Pa. Superior Ct.
377-1925; Re Guardian for Belle N. Nicholls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct.
38-1926; City v. Bailey, 8 Phila. 485-1870, and Bumpus's Estate, 23
Dist. R. 654-1914.
An agreement to the contrary before marriage does not change
the rule: Barning v. Barning, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 291-1911.
In Starr v. Starr, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 579-1922, it is said (582):
"The husband, as traditional head of the family, and the only one
primarily liable for its support, ordinarily selects the home. Under
normal circumstances, therefore, the husband's domicil determines
that of the wife, because her home in fact follows his."
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Comment: The husband is the head of the family,
which includes the wife and minor children, and in normal
cases the members of the family have their domicil at the
place where he has his domicil.
(1) On marriage, the wife takes the domicil the hus-
band has at that time.
1. A has a dwelling-house in X, where he has his
domicil. He marries B. A and B travel on their honey-
moon. B has never been in X. B's domicil is X.
2. A is domiciled in X. He gives up his home in
X but does not acquire a home elsewhere. He marries"
B. B's domicil is X.
(2) If the husband changes his domicil, the wife's
domicil changes with it.
3. A is domiciled in X. He goes to Y and buys a
house and acquires a domicil there. B, his wife, remains
in X for a time and has never been in Y. B's domicil
is Y.92
(3) A void marriage has no effect upon the domicil
of the woman. If she does in fact make her home with
her supposed husband, she acquires a domicil of choice in
the place where she lives with him.98
This is true whether or not the woman knows that the
marriage is void.
Section 30. If a wife lives apart from her husband
without being guilty of desertion, she may acquire a sep-
arate domiciL.9
92Accord: Scranton Poor District v. Directors, 106 Pa. 446
1884, (even if husband has deserted her); City v. Bailey, 8 Phila.
4&5-1870, (even if husband consented to separation).
But not for divorce jurisdiction: Bishop v. Bishop, 30 Pa. 412-
1858, and Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375--1867. See also; Wilson v. Wil-
son, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 20-1922.
93See Elk Twp. Overseers v. Jordan Twp. Overseers, 10 Pa. C.
C. 245--1889, and Wayne Twp. v. Porter Twp., 138 Pa. 181-1890.
Where the marriage was procured by fraud or by force, and
was never ratified, the wife's domicil does not follow that of her
husband: Hines v. Hines, 10 Pa. C. C. 74-1891.
94Accord: Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449-1847; Reed v. Reed,
30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Barning v. Barning, 46 Pa. Superior Ct.
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Comment: The determination of the circumstances
under which a wife may live apart from her husband with-
out being guilty of desertion is not a matter within the
scope of this subject.9 5
(1) If a wife lives apart from her husband without
being guilty of desertion, she may retain her domicil, al-
291-1911; Commonwealth v. Parker, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 74-1915;
Shaw v. Shaw, 72 Pa. Superior Ct. 191-1919; Spear v. Spear, 80 Pa.
Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. 1 D. & C. 699)-1922; Commonwealth v. Shetz-
line, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 100-1924, and Hilyard v. Hilyard, 87 Pa.
'Superior Ct. 1-1926. Until she does acquire a separate domicil,
her domicil is that of her husband: Scranton Poor District v. Dir-
ectors, 106 Pa. 446-1884; Luzerne etc. District v. Jenkins etc. Dir-
ectors, 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 16-1897, and Hines v. Hines, 10 Pa. C. C.
74-1891.
The decisions in Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts 349-1838; Bishop v.
Bishop, 30 Pa. 412-1858, and Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375-1867 support
the section. In addition see Hunnings V. Hunnings, SS Pa. Superior
Ct. 261-1913, and City v. Bailey, 8 Phila. 485-1870.
In Starr v. Starr, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 579-1922 it is said (582):
"It is well settled that a wife has not only the actual, but also the
legal, right to establish a separate domicil when ill-treated by her
husband. The man is lord of the domus only so long as he rules
lawfully."
In Hilyard v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Superior Ct. 1 1926, it is intimated
that, by virtue of the 19th Amendment, a married woman's power to
acquire a separate domicil is still further extended, at least so far
as voting domicil is concerned.
If the parties agree to separate for a definite period, it is said
that the wife cannot acquire a separate domicil until that period
has ended: Quinn v. Quinn, 6 D. & C. 712-1925, and see City v.
Bailey, 8 Phila. 485-1870.
If a wife becomes a feme sole under the act of May 4, 1885,
P. L. 430, 2 Purd. 1663, Section 5, Pa. St. 1920; Section 14581, she
may acquire a separate domcil: Overseers v. Overseers, 6 Sadler
591-1887 and see Knauer's Petition, 287 Pa. 115-1926.
9 5In Reed v. Reed, 30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906, it is said (236):
"Our laws recognize the right of a wife to establish a domicil sepa-
rate from that of her husband, when his conduct entitles her to
have the marriage dissolved, and this without a judicial determina-
tion of the question." See also Starr v. Starr, 78 Pa. Superior Ct.
579-1922 and Hilyard v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Superior Ct. 1-1926, re-
ferred to in note 94 supra and Knauer's Petition, 287 Pa. 115-1926,
and Hunnings v. Hunnings, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 261-1913.
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though he changes his domicil.
1. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X. B
elopes with another woman and makes his domicil in
Y. A continues to make her home in X. A's domicil
is X.
2. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X. B
deserts her and goes to Y, where he establishes a
domicil. A continues to make her home in X. A's
domicil is X.96
3. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X. B
goes t? Y and becomes domiciled there. He requests
A to come and live with him, but she refuses to do so
and keeps her home in X. By the law of X she is not
guilty of desertion in refusing to follow him. A's
domicil is X.
(2) If a wife lives apart from her husband without
being guilty of desertion, she may acquire a new domicil
apart from his.
4. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X. B
commits adultery. A goes to Y and makes her home
there. A is domiciled in Y.97
5. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X. By
a decree of a court of X, a judicial separation is granted.
A makes her home in Y. A's domicil is Y."
6. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X. A
and B separate by mutual consent. A makes her home
in Y. A's domicil is Y.99
96Accord: Commonwealth v. Parker, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 74-
1915; Shaw v. Shaw, 72 Pa. Superior Ct. 191-1919; Starr v. Starr,
78 Pa. Superior Ct. 579-1922, and Sherwood's Appeal, 17 W. N. C.
338-1886; and see Scranton Poor District v. Directors, 106 Pa. 446-
1884.
97Accord: Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Pa. 449-1847; Reed v. Reed,
30 Pa. Superior Ct. 229-1906; Spear v. Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct.
285 (s. c. 1 D. & C. 699)-1922, and Hilyard v. Hilyard, 87 Pa. Su-
perior Ct. 1-1926.
9 8Accord: Overseers of Williamsport v. Overseers of Eldred,
84 Pa. 429--1877.
9 Compare Quinn v. Quinn, 6 D. & C. 712-1925, where the par-
ties separated by mutual consent.
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7. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X.
Against B's will, A goes to live and makes her home
in Y. By the law of X this does not constitute de-
sertion. A's domicil is Y.
Note: The rule as here stated goes to the limit of the
law as it is generally accepted today: It is not intended
to indicate an opinion that the law may not be modified in
the future as a result of the undoubted trend of social
opinion in favor of full legal emancipation of married
women.
Section 31. Upon the termination of the marriage in
any way, or upon judicial separation, the wife may acquire
a new domicil; until she does so, she retains the domicil
which she had at the time of the termination of the marri-
age relation.100
Comment: Although the termination of the marriage,
either by death or by divorce, does not of itself change the
wife's domicil, it removes whatever disabilities she was
subject to as a married woman and leaves her free to ac-
quire a new domicil.
1. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X. He
dies. A's domicil is X.101
2. A is domiciled with B, her husband, in X. The
marriage is terminated by a divorce. A's domicil is
X.
1 0 2
3. A is the wife of B. Although B is domiciled
ifi X, A is domiciled in Y. The marriage is terminated
by a divorce. A's domicil is Y.108
10OAccord: Buffaloe v. Whitedeer, 15 Pa. 182-1850; Overseers
of Williamsport v. Overseers of Eldred, 84 Pa. 429-1877; Overseers
of Lake District v. Overseers of South Canaan, 87 Pa. 19-1878, and
Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918.
101Accord: Barclay's Estate, 259 Pa. 401-1918.
102Accord: Buffaloe v. Whitedeer, 15 Pa. 182-1850, and Over-
seers of Lake District v. Overseers of South Canaan, 87 Pa. 19-1878.
103See Barning v. Barning, 46 Pa. Superior Ct. 291-1911, and
Spear v. Spear, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 285 (s. c. 1 D. & C. 699)-1922.
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Section 32. Except as stated in Sections 33, 34, 35 and
36, a minor child has the same donicil as that of its
father.0 4
Comment: (1) At birth, a legitimate child of a living
father takes the domicil its father had at the time as its
domicil of origin. (See Section 16.)
(2) The domicil of the child during its minority con-
tinues to be that of its father, and upon a change of domicil
by its father the child takes the father's new domicil.105
The fact that the child lives apart from the father,
whether with the father's permission or not, is immaterial.
The child has no power to acquire a domicil of choice, nor
can the father fix the domicil of the child at any place
other than that at which the father has his domicil.
1. A is domiciled in X. He sends B, his minor
child, to school in Y. B's domicil is X.
2. A is domiciled in X. He sends B, his minor
child to live with its grandfather in Y. B's domicil
is X. °6
3. A is domiciled in X. His minor child, B, runs
away from home and lives in Y. B's domicil is X.107
10"Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806; School Dir-
ectors v. James, 2 W. & S. 568-1841; Overseers of Washington v.
Overseers of Beaver, 3 W. & S. 548-1842; West Chester School
District v. Darlington, 38 Pa. 157-1861; Highland Twp. Poor Dis-
trict v. Jefferson County Poor District, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 601-1904;
Fermanagh Twp. v. Walker Twp., 4 Clark 32-1846; Donegal Twp.
Overseers v. Sugar Creek Twp. Overseers, 20 W. N. C. 307-1887;
Taylor Minors' Estate, 26 W. N. C. 576-1890; Minzer's Estate, 2
Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465--1893; Reitmeyer v. Wolfe, 2 Dist. R.
810, 13 Pa. C. C. 179-1893; Cannon's Estate, 15 Pa. C. C. 312-1894,
and Yerkes v. Stetson, 13 Dist. R. 696-1904.
0 5Accord: Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349-1806, and Overseers
of Washington v. Overseers of Beaver, 3 W. & S. 548-1842.
106Accord: Highland Twp. Poor District v. Jefferson County Poor
District, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 601-1904; Plum Creek Overseers v.
South Bend Overseers, 1 Penny. 408-1881; Reitmeyer v. Wolfe, 2
Dist. R. 810, 13 Pa. C. C. 179-1893; Cannon's Estate, 15 Pa. C. C.
312-1894, and Yerkes v. Stetson, 13 Dist. R. 696-1904.
'
0TAccord: Fermanagh Twp. v, Walker Twp., 4 Clark 32--1846.
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4. A is domiciled in X. B, his minor child, is
bound out to service by the public authorities in Y.
B's domicil is X.
(3) By statute in several states the father and mother
are constituted "joint guardians" of their minor children.
Where that is the case, if the father and mother have
separate domicils, a minor child takes the domicil of the
parent with whom it lives in fact.0 8 If it lives with neither,
its domicil is that of the father.
Section 33. An emancipated minor child may acquire
a domicil of choice. 109
Comment: The determination of the circumstances
under which a child is emancipated is not within the scope
of this subject.
(1) A change of domicil by the father does not change
the domicil of the emancipated child; for if a minor child
is emancipated, the power of the parent to control the
domicil of the child ceases.
(2) An emancipated child may acquire a new dom-
icil as a domicil ceases.
1. A is domiciled in X. B, his minor son, marries
with or without A's consent. By the law of X marriage
emancipates a minor child. B makes his home in Y.
B's domicil is Y.
2. A is domiciled in X. B, his minor daughter,
is married with or without A's consent to C, whose
domicil is Y. By the law of X, marriage emancipates
a minor child. C dies while B is still a minor. B's
domicil is Y.
3. A is domiciled in X. By the law of X, a father
may voluntarily emancipate his minor child. A eman-
10sCompare: Cannon's Estate, 15 Pa. C. C. 312-1894.
'
09See Overseers of Washington v. Overseers of Beaver, 3 W.
& S. 548-1842; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. 302 (s. c. 8 Phila. 575)-
1872; Davidson, et al., Overseers v. Moreland, et al., Overseers, 7
W. N. C. 12-1879, and Hemlock Twp. Poor District v. Shickshinny
Bor. Poor District, 6 Kulp 169-1889.
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cipates B, his minor child. A makes his home in Y.
B makes his home in Z. B's domicil is Z.
4. A and his wife B are domiciled in X. They
abandon C, their minor child. By the law of X,
abandonment emancipates a minor child. C goes to
Y and earns his living there, making Y his home. B's
domicil is Y.
Section 34. In the case of divorce or separation of the
parents, the minor child's domicil is that of the parent to
whose custody it has been legally given; if there has been
no legal fixing of the custody, its domicil is that of the
parent with whom it lives, but if it lives with neither, it
retains the father's domicil.11 °
Comment: This principle is applicable in the case
of a divorce, judicial separation, or voluntary separation of
the parents.
If the father abandons his family, the minor children
living with the mother have the domicil of the mother.
Section 35. An illegitimate minor child has the same
domicil as that of its mother.1
Comment: (1) At birth, an illegitimate child takes
the domicil its mother had at the time as its domicil of
origin. (See Section 14.)
(2) Upon a subsequent change of domicil by its
mother, the child takes the mother's new domicil. 11
110Accord: Overseers v. Overseers, 6 Sadler 591-1887.
1
"See Nippenose Twp. Poor Overseers v. Jersey Shore Borough
Poor Overseers, 48 Pa. 402-1865; Lower Augusta Twp. v. Selins-
grove, 64 Pa. 166-1870; Wayne Twp. v. Porter Twp., 138 Pa. 181-
1890, and Pine Twp. Overseers v. Franklin Twp. Overseers, 4 Dist.
R. 715-1894.
In Crossley v. Demott, 2 Leg. Op. 161-1871, it is held that,
until an illegitimate child gains a settlement for itself, its place of
settlement is where the mother was legally settled at the time of
birth, and that the child's settlement does not follow its mother's
settlement.
112 B-ut see Crossley v. Demott, 2 Leg. Op. 161-1871, and Lime-
stone Twp. Overseers v. Licking Twp. Overseers, 1 Penny. 475--1881,
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(3) If an illegitimate child is legitimized as to the
father, the child acquires the domicil of the father; and if
the act of legitimation legitimizes the child from birth, the
child's domicil becomes that of the father as from the time
of its birth. (For a discussion of legitimation, see Sections
140 to 144, infra.)
(4) If a child is legitimized as to the mother only, its
domicil is unaffected by the legitimation.
Section 36. An adopted minor child has the same dom-
icil as that of the adoptive parent.18
Comment: (1) The domicil of an adopted child be-
comes at the moment of adoption that of the adoptive
parent.
(2) Upon a subsequent change of domicil by the
adoptive parent, the domicil of the adopted child follows
that of the adoptive parent.
(3) The domicil of the child, upon its adoption, ceases
to follow that of the natural father.
Section 37. Upon the death of the father, the domicil
which a minor child has at the time of the father's death
continues to be its domicil during minority, unless its dom-
icil is changed according to the principles stated in Sections
38, 39 and 40.1.4
Comment: The death of the father does not eman-
cipate the child, and it cannot by its own choice acquire a
new domicil.
"13Accord: Foley's Estate, 11 Phila. 47, 1 W. N. C. 301-1875.
Jurisdiction to adopt may be exercised by the court of the
minor's domicil: McQuiston's Adoption, 238 Pa. 304-1913, or by the
court of the adoptive parent's domicil: Thompson's Adoption, 290
Pa. 586-1927. See also Bumpus's Estate, 23 Dist. R. 654-1914.
"'4Accord: School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. 568-1841;
Wilkins' Guardian, 146 Pa. 585-1892; Donegal Twp. Overseers v.
Sugar Creek Twp. Overseers, 20 W. N. C. 307-1887, and Mintzer's
Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465-1893.
Compare Taney's Appeal, 97 Pa. 74-1881 (involving only a change
of residence).
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1. A is domiciled in X. A tells B, his minor child,
on A's death to go and live with his uncle C, domiciled
in Y. A dies. B obeys A's request. B's domicil is X.
Section 38. If a guardian of the child's person is ap-
pointed, he may change the dornicil of the child by estab-
lishing its home within but not outside the state in which
he was appointed.115
Comment: (1) The ward may acquire a domicil in
any place where the guardian causes him to live within
the state in which the guardian was appointed.
(2) The ward may not acquire a domicil in any place
outside the state in which the guardian was appointed.
(3) The ward does not take the domicil of the
guardian unless he lives with the guardian.110
Section 39, If the father dies and no guardian of the
child's person is appointed, the child has the same donicil
as that of its mother."'
Comment: Upon the death of the father, if no legal
guardian of the child's person is appointed, the mother is
entitled to the custody of the child.
(1) If the father dies before the birth of the child, it
takes the domicil of its mother as its domicil of origin.
(See Section 16.)
11 Accord: School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. 568-1841;
Wilkins' Guardian, 146 Pa. 585-1892, and Fulton's Estate, 14 Phila.
298--1881; although the guardian can (even fraudulently) change
the residence of the minor to another state: Taney's Appeal, 97 Pa.
74-1881, and Wilkins' Guardian, 146 Pa. 585--1892; but see Fulton's
Estate, 14 Phila. 298-1881. Wilkins' Guardian, supra, intimates that
the domicil of the minor may be changed to another state with the
consent of the domiciliary court; and in Moffit's Account, 32 Pitts.
L. J. 414-1885, such consent seems to have been given. See also
Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465-1893.
But a guardian of the minor's estate cannot change the domicil
of the child: West Chester School Dist. v. Darlington, 38 Pa. 157-
1861.
11 Accord: School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. 568-1841.
117Accord: School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. 568-1841, and
Burrel Twp. v. Pittsburgh Poor Guardians, 62 Pa. 472-1870.
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(2) If the father dies after the birth of the child, it
then takes the domicil of the mother and its domicil changes
with hers.
(3) Even if the mother remarries, the child's domicil
follows that of the mother, if the child continues to make
its home with the mother;11s if not it remains during
minority domiciled in the place of the mother's domicil
immediately before her remarriage.
Section 40. If both parents of a minor child are dead
and no guardian of the child's person is appointed, a grand-
parent who takes the child to his home to live becomes its
natural guardian, and the domicil of the child is that of the
grandparent so long as the child continues to live with
him.1l0
Comment: No other relative than the mother or one
of the grandparents can be a natural guardian of the child.
1. A, the surviving parent of B, a minor child,
is domiciled in X. B is living with its grandfather in
Y where the grandfather has his domicil. A dies. B's
domicil is Y.
2. A, the surviving parent of B, a minor child,
is domiciled in X. He dies. No legal guardian is ap-
pointed. The child goes to live with its grandfather
who is domiciled in Y. B's domicil is Y.
3. A, the father of B, a minor child, is domi-
ciled in X. A. dies. B lives with its mother, C, in Y
where she is domiciled. C dies and no legal guardian
"'8Accord: Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465-
1893; the dictum in School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. 568-1841
is to the contrary.
"'gBut see Northumberland etc. Overseers v. Milton etc. Over-
seers, 20 W. N. C. 84-1887; Donegal Twp. Overseers v. Sugar Creek
Twp. Overseers, 20 W. N. C. 307-1887, and Taylor Minors' Estate,
26 W. N. C. 576-1890.
Compare Taney's Appeal, 97 Pa. 74-1881 (notice court's state-
ment that domicil was not changed); Wilkins' Guardian, 146 Pa. 585
-1892; Moore's Estate, 18 Dist. R. 290-1908 (contest between grand-
parents); and Mintzer's Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C,. 465--1893,
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is appointed. B goes to live with D, its uncle who is
domiciled in Z. B's domicil is Y.
4. A, the father of B, a minor child, is domiciled
in X. The mother is dead. A dies. C, his brother,
clandestinely takes B to Y. B is still domiciled
in X.120
Section 41. An insane person or one of unsound mind,
who is possessed of sufficient mental capacity to choose a
home, may acquire a domicil as if he were sane; if he is so
far deprived of his reason as to be incapable of choosing
his home, he cannot acquire a domicil of choice.
1 21
Comment: (1) It is in every case a question of fact
whether a person who is insane or of unsound mind has
sufficient mental capacity to choose a home.
(2) If a person after coming of age becomes mentally
incompetent to choose a home and no legal guardian of his
person is appointed, his domicil continues to be in the place
in which he had his domicil before he became insane.
(3) If a person before coming of age becomes men-
tally incompetent to choose a home and he continues to
live with his parent and no legal guardian of his person is
appointed, he does not become emancipated and he con-
tinues to have the same domicil as that of his parent so
long as he remains insane and continues to live with his
parent.1
22
(4) Except as stated in comment (3), an insane per-
son who is mentally incompetent to choose a home, and of
120Accord: Taylor Minors' Estate, 26 W. N. C. 576-1890. But
compare Taney's Appeal, 97 Pa. 74-1881; Wilkins' Guardian, 146
Pa. 585-1892; Fulton's Estate, 14 Phila. 298-1881, and Mintzer's
Estate, 2 Dist. R. 584, 13 Pa. C. C. 465-1893.
121Accord: Overseers of Washington v. Overseers of Beaver, 3
W. & S. 548-1842; Shippen v. Gaines, 17 Pa. 38-1851; Scranton
Poor District v. Directors, 106 Pa. 446-1884, and Overseers v. Over-
seers, 6 Sadler 591-1887. Compare Re Guardian for Belle N. Nich-
olls, 86 Pa. Superior Ct. 38-1926.
122Accord: Overseers of Washington v. Overseers of Beaver, 3
W. & S. 548-1842, and Shippen v. Gaines, 17 Pa. 38-185.
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whose person no legal guardian is appointed, does not ac-
quire a new domicil in a place in which he lives.
(5) If a guardian of an insane person who is in-
capable of acquiring a domicil of choice is appointed, the
insane person acquires a domicil with the guardian if he
lives with him, otherwise his domicil is unchanged.
(6) An insane person who is sent against his will to
an asylum does not acquire a domicil in the asylum.
(7) If an insane person becomes sane, or mentally
competent, to choose a home, he may thereafter acquire
a domicil of choice.
Section 42. A corporation is domiciled in the state
where it was chartered, and cannot acquire a domicil out-
side that state.12 3
Comment: (1) The domicil of a corporation is in the
state where it was chartered and at the place within the
state where its principal office is, located.
(2) Although the corporation does business outside
the state where it was chartered, it cannot acquire a domi-
cil outside that state.
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123Accord: Ohio Cities Gas Co. v. Hines, 69 Pitts. L. J. 409-
1921; Petruccelli v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 75 Pitts. L. J. 345--1927.
In Allegheny County v. Cleveland etc. Rd. Co., 51 Pa. 228-1865, it
is said (231) that a corporation "can have no legal existence out of
the bounds of the sovereignty by which it was created. It must
dwell in the place of its creation."
